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Introduction: why a quantitative approach? 
 
Does civic activism contribute to the social accountability of governments? If so, 
how? And how is civic activism measured? And can we measure social accountability 
in a meaningful way? If there is a relationship, does it also appear on a large scale, 
across countries? 
 These are typical questions that cannot be answered at the individual country 
level. If we agree that in country X, governments do a bad job in providing the 
population with access to good quality health care services, how can we improve this? 
If it is a fragile state, with an armed conflict or recovering from a natural disaster, or a 
deeply corrupt state, it is likely that these are the factors standing in the way of 
adequate service delivery. If country Y is among the poorest ten counties in the world, 
it is very likely that it is a lack of financial resources - income and public expenditures 
on health - which constrains the delivery of adequate health care services to all 
people, urban and rural, rich, middle class and poor. But if country Z is not a low-
income country and not a fragile state, and we nevertheless agree that its health care 
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services are underperforming, can we expect that civic activism will contribute to 
better service delivery? Of course, we can follow a country like Z over time to see if 
civic activism generates the social transformation pushing for more social 
accountability of the government of country Z. But if health care services improve 
over time in this country, how do we know this is not because of economic growth? 
Or because a new government spends more money on health care? How do we know 
whether civic activism really plays a role that makes a difference? Moreover, how do 
we measure that health care services improve - do we measure the number of hospital 
beds available, or the number of doctors per one thousand inhabitants? Do we know 
that it is not a more intensive use of health care services by the middle class rather 
than wider access for the poor? More accessible service in cities than in rural areas? 
 These are many questions. And they cannot be answered with a case study at 
the country level because there are so many factors at play and we cannot compare 
country Z with other countries which have a different level of GDP, lower or higher 
health expenditures, and better or worse health care services, or more or less social 
exclusion. So, whatever we find for country Z cannot be generalized because all the 
variation of all relevant variables is limited to n = 1. With a one-country study we 
have only one level of GDP per capita, only one level of health care spending, only of 
level of government effectiveness, and only one level of health care services. In other 
words, the sample size is one (n = 1) and this does not allow to analyse how different 
levels of the relevant variables just mentioned influence better health care service 
delivery. 
 The advantage of using a cross-country quantitative approach is that the 
analysis can make use of a large sample size, even including all developing countries 
(as long as data availability allows, of course). The variation thus created in the 
sample (with n > 100 in the case of all developing countries) allows us to detect 
statistical relationships between variables. These relationships may be positive or 
negative, large or small, and statistically significant rather than occurring by chance 
(the standard probability used for a true relationship is 95%, with 90% as the lower 
alternative and 99% as the higher alternative). So, a cross-country quantitative 
analysis of the role of civic activism for social accountability adds the civic 
innovation concept of scale to the key concept of activism. By increasing the scale of 
the analysis, we can give an answer to the question whether, in general, civic activism 
is positively related to social accountability and how strong that relationship is 
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relative to other factors contributing to social accountability. 
 What is more difficult to assess with a quantitative study is the direction of 
causality. This is an important question. If we assume that civic activism improves 
health care services, we should be able to eliminate the possibility that better health 
care services create more civic activism (through shifting people's priorities from their 
family's health to social issues), or that better health care services generate higher 
incomes (through healthier workers). Can quantitative studies do this? Well, let's first 
see if qualitative studies can eliminate reverse causality. Would an in-depth case study 
of civic activism and health care services in country Z be able to uncover a one-
directional relationship from civic activism to health care? There is no guarantee that 
better health services contribute to more civic activism by shifting people's priorities. 
And economic growth may play its part as well. Hence, a quantitative study suffers 
from a similar weakness when it comes to eliminating the possibility of reverse 
causality. Of course, a case study can trace mechanisms by asking people, by 
observation of processes, and analysing newspapers or policy documents that have 
been published at different points time. But this results in a very contextual causal 
analysis, which may not at all be relevant in a different country context or time 
period. 
 There are econometric techniques available that at least help to check for the 
reverse causality. First, a time-consistency test of changes in the dependent variable 
and changes in the explanatory variable. If, as we assume, the explanatory variable 
causes the dependent variable, increases in the explanatory variable should precede 
increases in the dependent variable over time. Just like the application of fertilizer 
precedes the growth of plants in time. The econometric tests for this is the Granger-
causality test. Simply compares the data over time of two sets of variables to see if 
changes in the one (increases or decreases) precede changes in the other (increases or 
decreases) variable. In a regression analysis, the idea behind this test can also be 
integrated by using time-lags in explanatory variables. So that variable Xt-1 is used as 
the explanatory variable in a regression with Yt as dependent variable. For example, t 
is the year 2010 and t-1 is the year 1999. Or you may want to use t-5 for a five-year 
time-lag, so that the X variable used is for the year 2005, whereas the Y variable used 
is for the year 2010. If then X has a statistic ally significant and sizeable relationship 
to Y we may well assume that X is a causal factor of Y rather than the other way 
around. 
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 But this test can only be applied for time-series data. Not for cross-section 
data, which uses data from countries at only one point in time. A second test can be 
applied for panel data. This is a dataset for which there is data available for more than 
one year per country. It has the following structure: country X year 1; country X year 
2; country Y year 1; country Y year 2; etc. The dataset that we will introduce in this 
chapter has five data points per country, so, year 1 until 5. With such a panel of data 
we can 'switch off' the variation within countries over time in the analysis and only 
use the variation between countries. In this way, we are able to disregard that country 
X undergoes significant changes over time, such as a military coup or a draught or a 
change of government. So that at least such changes cannot cause any changes in the 
explanatory variables. So, such kind of reversal causation is 'switched off'. A third 
econometric test for reversed causality is the most advanced and requires data for an 
additional variable, often a historical variable that logically cannot be influenced by 
the dependent variable. This is a called an instrumental variable (often referred to as 
IV). For example, if the dependent variable is better maternal health care services, and 
we want to be sure that this does not have any causal influence on civic activism, we 
need an instrumental variable, which substitutes for civic activism but cannot 
logically be influenced by better maternal health care. Perhaps a law allowing or 
prohibiting civic activism would be a suggestion for such an instrumental variable. 
Because it is not likely that an improvement of maternal health care will cause a law 
change on demonstrations. 
 Finally, our question as stated in the first sentence, whether civic activism can 
help governments' social accountability, can only be addressed meaningfully when we 
also take other factors into account that are likely to improve social accountability. In 
econometrics we call these control variables. Because we need to control for their 
influence. If civic activism has a sizeable, positive and statistically significant 
relationship with maternal health care, and we have tested for reverse causality, can 
we be sure that all the improvement in maternal health care is indeed caused by civic 
activism? Here comes in the difference between what is called a bi-variate regression 
analysis and a multi-variate regression analysis. The first one analyzes the 
relationship between only two variables: a dependent variable and an explanatory 
variable (also called independent variable). The problem with that is that it does not 
control for other factors that may also have an influence on the dependent variable. 
Multivariate regression analysis includes control variables. The results will show the 
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effects of each variable on the dependent variable. Hence, we can compare the 
influence of each variable. It allows us to see which variable has the biggest influence 
(size effect), and whether all variables are statistically significant or not, or only 
some. For example, with high economic growth and some civic activism, maternal 
mortality rates may go down. But the effect of civic activism may be very small 
compared to the effect of higher incomes. Or the effect of civic activism may seem 
big but it is not statistically significant, at least not at the 95% level of probability. So, 
multivariate regressions allow us to estimate the influence of each individual variable, 
to compare their relative influence, and to add up all effects to find the total effect.  
 But quantitative analysis has its own weaknesses. These vary from problems 
of measurement at the cross-country level and data limitations, to the fact that 
causality can never be established with full certainty. Moreover, not everything that 
matters can be measured. So, quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis are 
generally complementary. We argue in this chapter that this is also the case for 
research on civic innovation, as we show with our analysis of civic activism and 
social accountability. 
 
 In this study, we present and critically discuss the why and how of quantitative 
analysis of the relationship between civic activism and social accountability. An 
important variable that we include is press freedom, because it provides the necessary 
information that both parliamentarians and civil society need in order to be able to 
demand social accountability from the government. Hence, the literature below 
discusses the literature on the following three variables: social accountability, civic 
activism, and press freedom. 
 
 
Quantitative literature on social accountability, civic activism and press freedom 
 
We will first review the quantitative literature about the relationships between social 
accountability, civic activism, and press freedom. This will provide an overview of 
what we know and what we do not know yet from a macro-level perspective. It gives 
insights into relevant variables and relationships and gaps and disagreements in the 
current empirical debate. 
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Social accountability 
Government accountability has a social dimension, concerned with adequate service 
delivery, and a political dimension, concerned with democracy. Social accountability 
is concerned with the extent to which governments deliver what people demand (and 
pay for with their taxes), in particular universal public goods such as health care. This 
inevitably brings in values, about what is good health care and what is the 
responsibility of government to provide services to contribute to these social values. 
Hence, it is in the concept of social accountability that we bring in the civic 
innovation concept of values. In particular the social values of good health care as 
what people may expect from their governments.  
 We use the definition of service-delivery focused government accountability 
in line with Khemani (2005: 186), who gives three criteria. A public agency is 
accountable for service delivery if it (1) assumes and is assigned responsibility, (2) 
has some minimum resources and capacity, and (3) undertakes appropriate actions 
towards service delivery, given resource and capacity constraints. For this 
understanding of social accountability, Shah (2008) has argued that citizen-centric 
governance is the most effective approach to enforce service delivery. Both 
definitions are reflected in a recent study by IDS, in which citizens’ engagement is 
regarded crucial for governments to enable people to realize their right and gain 
access to resources (IDS, 2006). 
 Social accountability may also have a more transformational purpose, in the 
sense of empowerment. But we focus on the actual delivery of what governments are 
obliged to their populations: service delivery, and hence, the development dimensions 
of social accountability (Gaventa and McGee, 2013). 
 This social accountability model for service delivery implies, according to 
Shah, responsiveness, fairness, responsibility, and judicial accountability. This would 
result, among others, in public services consistent with citizen preferences, 
improvements in economic and social outcomes and quality of life, improvements in 
quantity, quality and access of public services, including for the poor, minorities and 
disadvantaged groups, and better and cheaper services. 
 A literature review by IDS on accountability and service delivery makes a 
distinction between social and political accountability. It recognizes that social 
accountability of government is through “a continuous relationship of citizen’s 
demands through street protests and mobilizations, public naming and shaming, 
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signing of petitions, etc.” (Mejia Acosta, 2010: 13) Social accountability is 
particularly focused on service delivery, according to IDS: “The core feature of social 
accountability mechanisms is to exert direct political influence on government 
officials to extract increased – and effective – government action in the short run. 
Through social accountability mechanisms, citizens have organized to demand service 
provision from government officials in charge of specific sectors (health, water, 
sanitation), sometimes even bypassing some elected bodies (national legislatures, city 
councils)” (idem).  
 The IDS desk review of sixteen case studies is qualitative but interestingly, it 
uses rather similar criteria for the process of social accountability as quantitative 
analyses: 
 demand for social accountability (production and use of independent media) 
 responsiveness in service delivery (social expenditures) 
 standards for service delivery (health outcomes) 
 enforceability (rule of law, government effectiveness) 
 
On the basis of the qualitative desk review, the IDS report suggests “a positive 
association between effective accountability and the adequate provision of 
government service.” (idem: 28) But the report admits that it cannot say anything 
about size effects and direction of causality. How big is the effect relative to effects of 
other factors, which influence adequate service delivery? Is it a major effect, or much 
less as compared to adequate budgets, for example? And how can we know that there 
is a causality running from the demand for accountability to increased standards for 
service delivery? Here is where quantitative analysis comes in to provide 
complementary insights. Quantitative analysis compares effects of different factors 
with each other, bot absolutely (size) and relatively (comparing size effects per 
variable). And quantitative analysis contributes some, although limited, causality 
checks to the analysis. 
 Qualitative studies on social accountability and civil society emphasize the 
role of interlocution, and the process through which civic activism leads to states 
becoming more effective in delivering to their populations (Tembo, 2013). But such a 
process is difficult to measure.  
 This study will measure the result of social accountability through one of the 
four criteria identified by IDS for quantitative studies: standards for service delivery. 
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Like the IDS study, it will also measure demand for social accountability. This will be 
done with variables for civic activism and press freedom. Next, as a control variable 
in the analysis, we will use the third criterion mentioned by IDS: responsiveness in 
service delivery, which we measure through social budgets (for health care). The 
fourth and final process criterion that IDS mentions is enforceability. Also this 
criterion we will use as a control variable, because with ineffective enforcement of 
laws, rights and policies, the government does not deliver sufficiently on social 
accountability. With these last two criteria, we use another civic innovation concept, 
namely institutions. Social expenditures, through government budgets, are an 
institution: they embody a set of rules of redistribution. And enforceability requires 
the operation of the rule of law, which is a government institution concerned with 
effectiveness of laws, rights, and policy implementation. So, social budgets and rule 
of law are the institutions that we include in our analysis. 
 Using all four criteria of the IDS study, we exactly follow IDS's typology of 
the process of social accountability. Three of the four criteria will be used in our 
analysis as input variables (the activism concept of civic innovation: civic activism 
and press freedom; the institutional concept of civic innovation through social 
budgets and also through the rule of law) and one criterion will be used as output 
variable: standards for service delivery, which is the values concept of civic 
innovation. 
 
Civic activism 
Civic activism is concerned with civic voice, with the monitoring and agenda setting 
roles of civil society vis-à-vis government. These roles of civil society have been 
referred to by Glasius (2010) as a mix of social capital, citizens active in public 
affairs, non-violent action, fostering public debate and counter hegemony. Fowler and 
Biekart (2008) therefore refer to these roles as the dynamic and agency dimensions of 
civil society, labeled as civic-driven change. Civic-driven change is in their view a 
combination of three dimensions: civic agency, collective action, and empowerment. 
This change, or at least this demand for change, by civil society, is the complement of 
the representative democratic checks and balances of governments. 
 The empirical literature is rather silent on the effectiveness of civic activism in 
holding governments accountable. An empirical study by Williamson (2009) has 
assessed the relative effectiveness of the informal institutions of civil society (pro-
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social norms, trust, cooperation, demonstration, etc.) vis-à-vis the formal institutions 
of the state, such as the rule of law. She finds that “countries that have stronger 
informal institutions, regardless of the strength of formal institutions, achieve higher 
levels of economic development than those countries with lower informal institutional 
scores” (Williamson 2009: 377). A recent UNDP report on inequality notes about the 
role of civil society that “coordinated mobilization is indispensable for people who 
wish to pursue a common interest and (…) claim specific policies” (UNDP, 2013: 
263).  
 A recent OECD overview study of social capital distinguishes four channels 
through which civic activism impacts upon wellbeing, through: (1) fostering trust and 
cooperative norms, (2) improving the performance of formal institutions, (3) having a 
direct impact on individual well-being, and (4) building networks and civic skills 
(Scrivens and Smith, 2013). The OECD review study does not include a quantitative 
analysis of how these channels are related and what their relative importance is. A 
recent quantitative study with ISS data on civic activism found that an increase in 
civic activism of 10% is associated with a statistically significant 4% poverty 
reduction (van Staveren and Webbink, 2012). The strong and statistically significant 
association of civic activism with poverty reduction indicates that the activities of 
civil society have an important effect on development outcomes. 
 
Civic activism, social accountability and independent media 
Empirical research on press freedom has demonstrated the importance of the free 
press for government accountability. In particular, studies by Pippa Norris (2006; 
2010) have shown the importance of this production dimension of independent media. 
In her 2006 study, she distinguished between three roles of the media: watch-dog, 
civic forum, and agenda-setter. Interestingly, these roles are very similar to the roles 
recognized in the literature on civil society, as the key roles that civic activism plays 
in holding governments accountable. This suggests that civic activism and press 
freedom are complementary, and mutually related: they feed into each other. The 
results of the empirical analysis in Norris (2006) show that press freedom is positively 
associated with greater political stability, rule of law, government efficiency in the 
policy process, regulatory quality, and low corruption. However, the study did not 
analyze the impact of press freedom on service delivery. Moreover, the regressions 
were only cross-country (hence, for a single year), without time-lags, and do not use 
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controls for formal institutions and social expenditures. This leads to over-estimation 
of effects. For example, when the level of GDP per capita is ignored, regression 
results tend to over-estimate the effect of the explanatory variable, as if economic 
development does not matter. But we know from the literature that GDP does matter: 
more highly developed countries tend to have more press freedom. So, part of the 
effect measured by Norris may well be due to economic development rather than to 
press freedom alone. 
  Tran et al. (2011) found a positive association between the press freedom and 
human development. The sample size, however, is small, with only 65 countries in a 
hierarchical regression analysis. Interestingly, they found endogeneity effects: press 
freedom seems to both influence human development and is in turn influenced by 
human development. 
 Becker and Vlad (2011) summarize in a detailed overview of the effects of 
independent media on development the empirical literature and conclude that press 
freedom correlates negatively with corruption, as expected, and positively with 
various development outcomes. 
 Studies on independent media recognize that press freedom is not in itself a 
sufficient indicator of information use. For example, Price (2011a, p. 12) states that 
"even a media system that is diverse and pluralistic may not achieve the goals of 
'voice'". Price also recognizes that none of the three available measures of 
independent media addresses 'voice'. They measure the production of information, not 
how civil society makes use of it. And as Norris made clear, one of the three roles of 
independent media is the creation of a civic forum - this is precisely the space, which 
civil society is likely to fill.  
 
The literature review points out that both press freedom and civic activism support 
government accountability. But there are clearly only very few wide-ranging 
quantitative studies available, and none of them include both press freedom and civic 
activism. Hence, an adequate analysis of the role of civic activism in government 
accountability needs to fill the gaps in the literature in the following ways: 
 include all relevant variables and make an informed choice about particular 
measures 
 identify specific service delivery variables, as the standards of social 
accountability 
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 include all developing countries and preferably over a medium or long period 
of time 
 
A framework for quantitative analysis 
Drawing on the causal chain approach to social accountability by Anuradha Joshi 
(2014), we simplify the model of mutual influences between the three variables in that 
model of information, citizen action, and state response. We measure these three 
variables as: 
- press freedom 
- civic activism 
- service delivery 
Whereas the causal chain approach assumes causal relations between these three in 
two directions, we focus on the causal relationships from information (press freedom) 
to state response (service delivery) and from citizen action (civic activism) to state 
response (service delivery), whereas our model allows for mutual influences between 
press freedom and civic activism as well. 
 
 
3. Variables and measurement 
 
This section identifies the relevant variables to measure government accountability, 
civic activism, the intermediate variable of independent media, as well as control 
variables. Next to this, it will explain the existing measures and discuss their strengths 
and weaknesses. 
 
Social accountability 
The government social accountability data are the outcome measures of public service 
delivery. They measure the extent to which people's wellbeing has improved - a social 
value. We have selected health care as a key wellbeing variable, with four variables. 
The health outcome variables that we use are: infant mortality, under five mortality, 
immunization DPT and immunization measles. The data are all from the World 
Development Indicators by the World Bank. 
 Infant mortality rate (IMR) is measured as deaths of children under one year 
per 1,000 live births. Under five mortality (U5MR) is similarly measured as deaths of 
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children under five year per 1,000 live births. The two immunization rates (ID and 
IM) are percentages of children between 12 and 23 months old.  
 
Civic activism 
ISS has a unique database, Indices of Social Development1. The ISD database is 
explained in a recent article by Foa et. al (2013). The database contains six indices, 
including one on the use that civic actors make of the media: Civic Activism Index 
(CA). This measures citizen's use of the media (listening to radio and TV news, 
reading newspapers and using internet to learn about political developments) and 
support for and participation in civic activities such as in demonstrations and 
petitions, as well as the strength of civil society (based on Civicus ratings)2. The ISD 
measure of the strength of civic activism uses 33 indicators on the extent of 
engagement in civic activities such as signing petitions or joining peaceful 
demonstrations, studies of the organisation and effectiveness of civil society, access to 
sources of media information, levels of civic awareness and information on political 
matters and concerns, and the extent to which civil society organisations are 
connected to broader, international networks of civic activity.  
 We could also use the variable Voice and Accountability Index (VA) of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank, although it is not a very 
suitable variable for the research question at hand. Because it includes press freedom 
and it focuses on political accountability. And it is constructed on the basis of expert 
opinions only: it lacks objective measures and attitudinal measures of the population. 
Voice and Accountability (VA) "captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media."  
 
Independent media 
Empirical research into independent media uses either the Press Freedom Index put 
together by Freedom House, or the Press Freedom Index developed by journalists 
themselves through Reporters without Borders. A more recent index is the Media 
Sustainability Index by IREX. The IREX started in 2000 covering only European 
                                                        
1 www.IndSocDev.org 
2 http://www.indsocdev.org/civic-activism.html 
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countries. It extended its measurement to the Middle East and North Africa in 2005 
and to Africa in 2007, and covers 80 countries today. But not in Asia and Latin 
America. The Media Sustainability Index measures, like the two press freedom 
indices, media independence. But it covers it slightly more broadly3. It includes an 
indicator on whether the public media reflects the views across the political spectrum, 
are nonpartisan, and serve the public interest; and an indicator on whether a broad 
spectrum of social interests are reflected and represented in the media, including 
minority-language information sources. But the large majority of indicators overlap 
with or are identical to those in the two press freedom indices. And none of the three 
independent media indicators includes investigative journalism or other indicators of 
the depth of independent media. 
 Two studies, which have compared the two press freedom indices of Freedom 
House and Reporters without Borders contradict each other in their findings about 
their similarity. They both compared the indices indirectly, by comparing their 
explanatory power in regression analyses with democracy and related variables. 
Norris (2006) concludes that they work out quite similarly in econometric analyses, 
whereas Tran et al (2011) find the results in regression analyses to be very different. 
A recent and more thorough and direct analysis of the two measures of press freedom 
confirms Norris: the two measures are found to be quite similar, over time and even 
across differences in country choices. Using correlation coefficients on each of the 
indicators making up each press freedom index, Becker and Vlad (2011, p. 38) 
conclude that: "The Freedom House measure and the Reporters without Borders 
measure are highly correlated. At present there is little to distinguish them." The 
average correlation (measured as r) between the two for the period 2002-2008 is 0.83. 
Hence, 70 per cent (measured as r2) of the variation in the one can be explained by the 
other. This is, statistically seen, quite high. Hence, it does not matter really which of 
the two press freedom measures is used in a quantitative study. We opt for the 
Freedom House variable because it is available for more countries. The Press 
Freedom Index (PF) developed by Freedom House measures media independence of 
print, broadcast, and internet media. It consists of 109 indicators in three areas4: legal 
environment (laws, regulations, guarantees, and independence of the judiciary 
                                                        
3 http://www.irex.org/resource/media-sustainability-index-msi-methodology 
4 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2012/methodology#.U4MMHy80zeY 
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bodies), political environment (political control such as censorship, news diversity, 
intimidation and violence against journalists), and economic environment 
(transparency and concentration of ownership of media sources, selective withholding 
of advertising or subsidies, and bribery). 
 It is important to note that The Press Freedom Index is measured negatively. 
PF of 0 means full press freedom and 1 means no press freedom at all. All other 
variables are measured positively. So, for example, a Civic Activism score of 0 means 
no civic activism and 1 a very high level of civic activism.  
 
Control variables 
Control variables are expected, on the basis of the literature, to also have an influence 
on the service delivery outcome variables of health. The most important one is the 
level of economic development of a country, measured as GDP per capita (GDP). The 
richer a country, the more likely it is that the government will have the capacity for 
adequate service delivery. GDP per capita is measured in dollars, and varies from a 
few hundred per year in the poorest countries to several thousand dollars per year in 
middle income countries. In line with econometric practice, the income data has been 
normalized by taking the logarithm: lnGDP pc5.  
 The higher the share of government expenditures on health care, the more 
resources available for social service delivery. We therefore use the share of GDP 
spent by government on health care (percentages). The data for Expenditures on 
Health (EXPH) are provided by World Bank's World Development Indicators6. 
 With an adequate rule of law in place, a country is more likely to be able to 
deliver services effectively. Rule of Law "captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence"7. It is a comprehensive index of formal institutions 
                                                        
5 Income data are not normally distributed: many people earn low incomes, a relatively small or large 
middle class group earns around the modal income, whereas a very small group earns extremely high 
incomes. As a consequence, the average income of a country will be much higher than the modal 
income. This non-normal distribution of incomes implies that standard quantitative analysis will suffer 
from biases. In order to prevent such biases, the income distribution must be transformed to a normal 
distribution. Turning income values into natural logarithms will do that: this transformation will reduce 
the distribution at the high-end, so that extreme incomes will no longer bias the estimation results. 
6 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
7 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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representing the effectiveness of government to protect citizen's rights. The Rule of 
Law index (RL) is part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank. 
Rule of Law (RL) is measured in rank percentiles between 0 and 1, with 1 the highest 
level of rule of law.  
 
Table 1 provides an overview of all the relevant variables, their measurement, and 
their sources, categorized over three variable categories: dependent variable, 
explanatory variable, and control variable. 
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Table 1. Overview of variables 
Type Category Name Definition Source 
social 
accountability 
dependent 
variable 
IMR 
number of 
deaths per 
1,000 live 
born 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
  
dependent 
variable 
U5MR 
number of 
deaths per 
1,000 live 
born 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
  
dependent 
variable 
ID 
percentage 
immunised of 
12-23 years 
old DKTP 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
  
dependent 
variable 
IM 
percentage 
immunised of 
12-23 years 
old measles 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
civic use of 
media 
explanatory 
variable 
CA 
index of civic 
activism as 
rank 0-100 
Indices of 
Social 
Development 
  
explanatory 
variable 
VA 
index of 
voice and 
accountability 
as rank 0-100 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
production of 
media 
explanatory 
variable 
PF 
index of press 
freedom as 
rank 1-0 
Freedom 
House 
level of 
development 
control 
variable 
GDP 
logarithm of 
GDP per 
capita 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
social 
spending 
control 
variable 
EXPH 
percentage 
health 
expenditures 
of GDP 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
governance 
control 
variable 
RL 
index of rule 
of law as rank 
0-100 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
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4. Insights from quantitative analysis 
 
Bi-variate regression analysis 
Before going into the multivariate regression analysis, let us start with the more 
intuitive statistical relationships with the help of scatterplots. The four diagrams 
below show the statistical relationship between two variables in table 1 plus the 
regression line of best fit.  
 
 
Diagrams 1-4. Scatter plots between relevant variables 
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The first two scatter plots show on the vertical axis the two explanatory variables: 
press freedom (PF) in the first diagram and civic activism (CA) in the second 
diagram. The horizontal axes show two dependent variables, both social 
accountability variables: primary school completion rate (PCR) and under-5 mortality 
rate (U5MR). Hence, the two diagrams give a rough indication of how the 
explanatory variables are related to the dependent variables. Both show a negative 
relationship, and more or less the same size (the regression line has the same slope). 
Remember that PF is measured negatively: 0 means full press freedom and 1 means 
absence of press freedom. Hence, the first diagram indicates that the more press 
freedom, the higher primary completion rate. In other words, the more independent 
the media, the lower the school drop out. But does this mean that we can attribute 
higher completion rates to press freedom?  
 The second diagram indicates that the more civic activism, the lower child 
mortality. This seems a desirable result of an active civil society - civic activism 
seems to be able to force governments to deliver more effective child health care 
services. But are lower child mortality rates simply attributable to an active civil 
society? 
 The third and fourth diagrams point out that the relationships of the first two 
scatter plots are not so straightforward. Diagram three shows that press freedom is 
also positively related (mind the negative measurement!) to health expenditures. 
Perhaps the positive effect of press freedom on the reduction in child mortality is not 
a direct effect at all, but runs through higher health care budgets. Diagram four 
suggests a similar indirect effect. Civic activism is positively related to rule of law in 
this scatter plot. So, perhaps civic activism has no direct effect on service delivery at 
all, but only on a more effective rule of law, which in turn contributed to a more 
effective service delivery. 
 Bi-variate correlations are a very crude method to measure statistical 
relationships. Because they do not control for the influence of other variables, which 
may be equally important or even more influential. That is why we need to do 
multivariate regression analysis. This allows for estimating the simultaneous 
influence of all relevant factors. Which factors are most relevant? Which factors 
become irrelevant or even have a reverse influence when other factors are taken into 
account? What is the size of the effects? And what is their probability of being 
estimated correctly (statistical significance)? 
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Multi-variate regression analysis 
A multi-variate regression analysis starts with a visual model (diagram 5). This shows 
the expected relationships between the various categories of variables. This is the 
model that we introduced at the end of the literature review. 
 
 
Diagram 5. Model for determinants of social accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The multi-variate regression analysis consists of four estimations, for each health care 
service delivery variable one. And each estimation includes five independent 
variables: two explanatory (press freedom and civic activism) and three control 
variables (GDP, public expenditures on health, Rule of Law). The results are given in 
the following terms: 
 
a) size of the parameter, indicating how big the influence is of each individual 
independent variable on the dependent variable 
b) sign of the parameter, indicating whether the effect is positive or negative 
c) statistical significance of the parameter, indicating the probability that the 
parameter estimated is the true value (generally 99%, 95%, or 90%) 
d) strength of the model, expressed as R square, with values above 30% generally 
considered to be strong 
 
The results allow a comparison between parameters, because the regression analysis 
returns parameter values for each variable. We will interpret here the results for a 
Press 
freedom 
Civic 
activism 
Service delivery 
Control 
variables 
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model estimation, based on our panel regression analysis (with fixed effects for 
countries) as carried out in the underlying quantitative study (Macedo de Jesus and 
van Staveren, 2014a and 2014b). The sample included 5 years of data (1990, 1995, 
2000, 2005, and 2010) and all developing countries (except those with missing data 
for certain variables, which makes the sample sized per estimated equation vary 
between n = 168 and n = 457 country-year cases). We also run the same regressions 
with time-lags for the independent variables, to test for time-consistency of the 
estimations. This is, next to the fixed-effects estimations, another test for causality: if 
the values of the independent variables of five years back still have substantive 
parameter sizes and are statistically significant, it is more likely that the regression 
results show the expected direction of causality. 
 Table 2 shows a summary of the results for the case that the value of an 
independent variable increases. What happens when there is 10% more civic activism 
(CA)? The table shows that in that case there are 8.9 less children dying under the age 
of one year old (IMR) on average for developing countries, and even 17.1 less 
children dying under the age of 5 (U5MR). Also, the immunization rates go up: 6% 
for DTP and 4% for measles (IM). But, the table shows that money has a bigger 
effect. 1% more economic growth (GDP) has a ten times bigger effect on under-5 
mortality, for example. And 10% more health expenditures by the government 
(EXPH) reduces child mortality more than twice as much as compared to 10% more 
civic activism ….  
 But Rule of Law (RL) is less effective than any of the other variables. The 
signs of the parameters are positive for civic activism on all explanatory variables. 
Also, statistical significance is strong for civic activism for all four health outcome 
variables. But not for press freedom – that is why press freedom has only empty cells 
in the table. 
 
The results imply that: 
1) Civic activism (CA) has a positive influence on social accountability in the 
area of health outcomes. 
2) Press freedom (PF) does not have a statistically significant effect on social 
accountability 
3) Money has stronger effects on health outcomes than civic activism, both 
through income (GDP) and through public expenditures on health (EXPH). 
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Table 2. Results for statistically significant determinants of social accountability 
Model: + 10% CA +10% PF +1% GDP +10% RL +10% EXPH 
infant mortality (IMR) 
number of children -8.9 - -12.3 -1.5 -20.3 
under-5 mortality (U5M) 
number of children -17.1 - -171 -3.0 -40.1 
immunization DTP (IDTP) 
percent +0.06 - +0.07 - +0.13 
immunization measles (IM) 
percent +0.04 - +0.08 - - 
 
 
 
Weaknesses 
Finally, we like to draw the attention to the weaknesses of our analysis. First, the 
service delivery variables, as outcome variables, not only refer to government efforts 
but also include efforts of the private sector and communities to deliver better health 
outcomes. Second, for various variables, there is missing data for individual country-
year combinations. We have been able to address this partially by using data for the 
years close to the selected years. This is justifiable, because also the CA index is 
constructed with data for the two years below and above the selected year. For 
example, where data was missing for a variable for 2005, but available for one of the 
years 2003, 3004, 2006, or 2007, we included the observations for the closest 
available year of these four alternative years for the 2005 data. Third, although we did 
causality checks, the results can never provide a hundred per cent reliability of the 
direction of causality. But, compared to the empirical literature discussed above, our 
estimations address the endogeneity issue more extensively, in three complementary 
ways. We did this through a Granger-causality test for the independent media 
variables, we used a fixed effects estimation, and we did a robustness check with 
time-lagged variables for independent media. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
A comprehensive quantitative analysis of civic innovation can provide 
complementary insights to qualitative analyses due to the large scale level of the 
analysis revealing general patterns across countries. In particular, it points at size 
effects, the probability of these, their signs (positive or negative effects), and relative 
effect to other variables. It also uses key concepts of civic innovation, next to scale, 
which, in our analysis of civic activism and social accountability are activism, values, 
and institutions.  
 The overall conclusion from our analysis is that a quantitative analysis of civic 
innovation is possible and meaningful, but not entirely on its own. Its results are most 
meaningful in combination with qualitative analysis, either through the use of primary 
data analysis, or through a thorough literature review or a mixed-methods approach 
with a variety of qualitative research methods. Whereas civic innovation analysis can 
never be reduced to numbers, a quantitative analysis reveals general patterns, size 
effects, and some clues about causality. It is particularly the scale of quantitative 
analyses of civic innovation, which provides the complementarity to qualitative 
studies.  
 
 
  
  23 
Bibliography 
 
Becker, Lee, and Tuder Vlad, 'The Conceptualization and Operationalization of 
country-level measures of media freedom', in Price, Monroe, Susan Abbott, and 
Libby Morgan (eds.) Measures of Press Freedom and Media Contributions to 
Development - evaluating the evaluators. New York: Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 23-43. 
Coronel, Sheila, ‘Corruption and the Watchdog Role of the News media’, in Pippa 
Norris (ed.) Public Sentinel – News Media and Governance Reform. Washington 
D.C.: The World Bank, 2006, pp. 111-136. 
Foa, Roberto, Arjan de Haan, Irene van Staveren, and Ellen Webbink (2014) ‘The Last 
Mile in Analyzing Wellbeing and Poverty  Indices of Social Development’, Forum 
for Social Economics, 43 (1), pp. 8-26.  
Fowler, Alan, and Kees Biekart (2011) Civic Driven Change: a Narrative to Bring 
Politics back into Civil Society Discourse. Working Paper no. 529. Institute of 
Social Studies: The Hague. 
Gaventa, John, and Rosemary McGee (2013) ‘The Impact of Transparency and 
Accountability Initiatives’, Development Policy Review 31 (S1), pp. S3-S28. 
Glasius, M. (2010) ‘Dissecting Global Civil Society: Values, Actors, Organizational 
Forms’, Working Paper 14. The Hague: Hivos. 
IDS (2006) Making Accountability Count. IDS Policy Briefing issue 33, November 
2006. 
Joshi, Anuradha (2014) ‘Reading the Local Context: a Causal Chain Approach to 
Social Accountability’, IDS Bulletin 45 (5). 
Khemani, Stuti, ‘Local Government Accountability for Health Service Delivery in 
Nigeria’, Journal of African Economies 15 (2), 2005, pp. 285-312. 
Macedo de Jesus, Anderson, and Irene van Staveren (2014a) Production and Use of 
Independent Media: Road to Government Accountability? The Hague: Institute of 
Social Studies. 
Macedo de Jesus, Anderson, and Irene van Staveren (2014b) Production and Use of 
Independent Media: Road to Government Accountability? The Hague: Institute of 
Social Studies. Working Paper 2014-1 Indices of Social Development. URL: 
http://www.indsocdev.org/resources/Working_Paper_2014-
1_Production_and_Use_of_Independent_Media.pdf 
Mejia Acosta, Andres (2010) Democratic Accountability and Service Delivery – a 
  24 
Desk Review. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS). 
Price, Monroe, 'Press Freedom Measures: an Introduction', in Price, Monroe, Susan 
Abbott, and Libby Morgan (eds.) Measures of Press Freedom and Media 
Contributions to Development - evaluating the evaluators. New York: Peter Lang, 
2011a, pp. 1-19. 
Price, Monroe, Susan Abbott, and Libby Morgan (ed.s) Measures of Press Freedom 
and Media Contributions to Development - evaluating the evaluators. New York: 
Peter Lang, 2011b. 
Norris, Pippa, ‘The Role of the Free Press in Promoting democratization, Good 
Governance, and Human Development’. Paper for UNESCO meeting on World 
Press Freedom Day. Colombo, 1-2 May 2006. 
Scrivens, Katherine, and Conal Smith, Four Interpretations of Social Capital: an 
agenda for measurement. OECD Statistics Working Papers, 2013/06. Paris: 
OECD. 
Shah, Anwar, Demanding to be Served: Holding Governments to Account for 
Improved Access. Policy Research Working paper 4643. 2008. Washington D.C.: 
The World Bank. 
Tembo, Fletcher (2013) Rethinking Social Accountability in Africa: Lessons from the 
Mwananchi Programme. London: ODI. 
Tran, Hai, Reaz Mahmood, Yong Du, and Andrei Khrapavitski, ‘Linking Measures of 
Global Press Freedom to Development and Culture: Implications from a 
Comparative Analysis’, International Journal of Communication 5, pp. 170-191. 
UNDP, Humanity Divided: confronting inequality in developing countries. New 
York: UNDP. 
Van Staveren, Irene, and Ellen Webbink, ‘Civil Society, Aid and Development: a Cross-
Country Analysis’, IOB Study, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, The 
Hague, June 2012. 
Williamson, Claudia (2009) ‘Informal Institutions Rule: Institutional Arrangements 
and Economic Performance’, Public Choice 139, pp. 371-387. 
 
